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ABSTRACT
This study focuses on Japanese group homes for the elderly with dementia and compares
the quality of long-term care services between nonprofit and for-profit providers. In
order to evaluate the quality of services offered, this study regards the change in a user’s
health condition from the onset of living in a group to the completion of the survey
period. The result implies that nonprofit providers with facility services and/or medical
services provide better quality and users’ transfers than for-profit providers because of the




The Japanese government introduced the long-term care (LTC) insurance system in April
2000. One of the key objectives of the system was to create an LTC market in order
to integrate the health, medical, and welfare service systems that had been vertically
divided independently in the past. Based on the objective, the role of this system is to
provide users with comprehensive services, i.e., to enable them to avail of a combination
of various types of services they require.
The system induced for-profit providers to enter the LTC market. Before the system
was implemented, care services for the elderly were offered on the basis of the ”Sochi”
system (Sochi seido in Japanese) in accordance with the Welfare Law for the Elderly.
Since the system owed public fund, the administrative office recognized eligible service
users and service contents within the budget constraint of the public fund. Under the
system, administrative office primarily assigned some social welfare corporations as the
service providers. The users were not permitted to select service contents and providers
independently. On the other hand, the newly introduced LTC insurance system allowed
users to select service contents and providers and to sign contracts with the providers.
This revised scheme motivated providers, particularly for-profit ones, to enter the LTC
market.
This study has two purposes. One is to consider whether there is a difference between
the behavior of nonprofit and for-profit providers. The other is to investigate the reason
for this difference in behavior. For these purposes, this study conducted an original
survey of the providers.
In previous literatures, some researchers theoretically discuss the difference between
the behavior of nonprofit and for-profit providers. For example, some analyses (Easley
and O’hara, 1983; Chillemi and Gui, 1991; Hirth, 1999) describe the market based
on a hypothesis presented by Hansmann (1980) that assumes asymmetric information
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between supply and demand. The hypothesis suggests that uninformed users tend to
choose nonprofit providers because they are anxious about the opportunistic behavior1)
of for-profit providers in markets characterized by asymmetric information.
Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) demonstrate the difference in the behavioral patterns of
nonprofit and for-profit providers by assuming the nonverifiable quality of LTC services
instead of asymmetric information. They describe an incomplete contract model and
conclude that the quality of service offered by nonprofit providers is higher than that
offered by for-profit ones. In their model, nonprofit providers invest nondistributed
profit toward the improvement of the quality of their services in order to enhance their
reputation or demonstrate their altruism in a concrete manner.
Besides, in the case of Japan, market entry regulations can be expected to be one
of the factors that affect the behavior of nonprofit and for-profit providers. Although
the LTC insurance system has permitted for-profit providers to enter the LTC market,
the market presently continues to have some regulations. One such regulation does
not permit the entry of for-profit providers into the ”facility services” sector.2) Figure 1
describes the market that for-profits are allowed to enter and the market that they are not
allowed to enter. Providers that are medical corporations or social welfare corporations
satisfy some requirements and are allowed to provide the facility services as per the
Welfare Law for the Elderly. The other regulation does not allow for-profit providers to
supply medical services as per the Medical Care Law.
Under the abovementioned regulations, some medical and social welfare corporations
enjoy the benefit of diversification, i.e., the synergy effect between facility services and/or
medical services and other LTC services. For example, if nonprofit providers with facility
services and/or medical services apply care skills accumulated in these services to other
LTC services, the quality of the LTC services provided by these nonprofits may be
superior to those provided by for-profits. In addition, these nonprofits may smoothly
introduce and transfer users between facility services and/or medical services and other
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LTC services, taking into consideration users’ health conditions. If these nonprofits
providers are benefited in this manner, they may have an advantage over the for-profits
in terms of service quality and users’ transfer.
In its report, the Fair Trade Commission (2002) considers the effect of the regulations
as a problem. This report is based on an original survey. According to the survey, many
for-profit providers believe that social welfare corporations and medical corporations
have advantages in market competition. The reason for this is that these corporations
are allowed to supply a combination of ”in-home services” and facility services. For-profit
providers are allowed to enter some markets of in-home services but not those of facility
services.
The Japanese government allows for-profit providers to enter the market of welfare
facilities for the elderly requiring care and that of medical services in a ”Special dereg-
ulation zone”: (Kozo kaikaku tokubetsuku in Japanese).3) In the special deregulation
zone, the Japanese government exceptionally accepts deregulation that is not accepted
elsewhere in Japan. This zone is part of a policy toward structural reconstruction. The
purpose of this policy is to extend the successful deregulation in the zone to a nationwide
scale and thereby foster economic growth. If for-profit providers enter the market in the
special deregulation zone, the outcome of this attempt will be disclosed in the future.
The aim of this study is to examine whether the regulations create an advantage
for nonprofit providers with facility services and/or medical services in the market of
other LTC services. Since this study can obtain information on service quality and
users’ transfer from the original survey, the analysis in this study focuses on LTC service
quality and users’ transfer. In this survey, other variables apart from service quality
(for example, each group home’s financial statements) were considered for the analysis.
However, the responses to the survey did not indicate that group home service providers
prepared financial statements for the group homes. Some providers own multiple group
homes. Some providers engage in group home business in addition to another business.
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Hence, in these cases, they prepare a financial statement that summarizes the financial
conditions in all divisions and businesses. It is not possible to identify each group home’s
financial data in the financial statement. In the survey, many group home administrators
and their assistants did not actually answer the question pertaining to the financial
statement.
If the analysis indicates a difference in the LTC service quality between nonprofits
with facility services and/or medical services and for-profits, the reason for this difference
needs to be specified. There are two reasons that can possibly explain this result. One
is the difference in terms of the providers’ maximization problems based on ownership
type. The other is the synergy effect between facility services and/or medical services
and other LTC services.
This study makes two types of comparisons in order to specify the reason. First,
the analysis compares the quality of LTC services between nonprofit providers with
facility services and/or medical services and for-profit providers in the same LTC market.
Second, the analysis compares the quality of LTC services between nonprofit providers
without facility services and medical services and for-profit providers in the same LTC
market. If both comparisons show that the nonprofits supply better quality LTC services
than for-profits, the result depends on the difference in the ownership type. On the other
hand, if the result of the first comparison only shows that nonprofits supply better quality
LTC services than for-profits, the reason depends on whether the entry of facility services
and/or medical services is permitted under the regulations.
The analysis focuses on the market of Japanese group homes for the elderly with
dementia in order to compare the quality of LTC services between nonprofits and for-
profits. The analysis of the group home market involves two advantages. First, this
market makes it possible to compare the quality of LTC services between nonprofits and
for-profits because both types of providers are allowed to enter the market. Second, this
study can easily collect information on each user from group homes because the number
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of users in a group home is not very high.
The Ministry of Health and Welfare (2000: p.111 and p.132) describes the contents of
LTC services in group homes. According to the description, group homes provide assis-
tance with bathing, voiding, feeding, other daily living care, and rehabilitation training
to the elderly with dementia who are in a stable condition. Group homes provide services
aiming create a small society that respects human relationships among elderly people and
to support them in the society. In group homes, each person is positioned as a family
member. This enables elderly users with dementia to live with peace in mind in a quiet
atmosphere that resembles a home.
Users rent private rooms in group homes. The expenditure for group home users
comprises individual payments for LTC services and other expenses incurred toward
room rent, haircuts, other purchases, and so on. The main sources of revenue for group
home providers are the LTC fee set by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
(MHLW) and the room rent determined by the market.
In order to evaluate the quality of group home services, this study employs an eval-
uation measure: users’ health conditions (outcome) after availing of the services of the
group home.
This study conducted an original survey in September and October 2003 on group
homes located in 13 major cities and some cities surrounding the 23 wards of Tokyo and
Osaka City. The survey includes information on group homes and users.
In previous empirical studies, many foreign researchers in economics and medicine
analyze the service quality of nonprofit and for-profit providers, focusing on the US
nursing home market. In the economic literature, Weisbrod (1988, Chapter 8), Cohen
and Spector (1996), Hirth (1993), and Grabowski and Hirth (2003) regard the variables
of staffing intensity (percentages of full-time workers, registered nurses, and licensed
practical nurses) as measures to evaluate the quality of LTC services. Additionally,
some studies (Weisbrod, 1988, Chapter 8; Cohen and Spector, 1996; Spector, Selden
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and Cohen, 1998; Chou, 2002; Grabowski and Hirth, 2003) analyze a patient’s health
condition (death, activities of daily living, pressure ulcer, dehydration, urinary tract
infection, physical restraint, catheter, and tube feeding) and the consumer satisfaction
of users and their families. In these literatures, the result of some studies was that
nonprofit providers supply better quality LTC services than for-profit providers; other
studies convey contrasting results. As discussed by Grabowski and Hirth (2003: p.4),
recent work in the literatures has continued to find mixed evidence.
In Japanese studies, some researchers examined the difference in the quality of
”home-visit care” (home-help service) provided by nonprofit and for-profit providers.
Suzuki (2002), Shimizutani and Suzuki (2006), and Kitazaki, Yamauchi and Suzuki (2004)
use some evaluation criteria for third-party assessment of the service quality of home-visit
care that were designed by some local governments in Japan. They analyze the origi-
nal surveys; in these surveys, service providers furnish answers to questions on whether
they satisfy the evaluation criteria defined by the local government. These literatures
compare nonprofit and for-profit providers based on the variables of management, ac-
cessibility, information disclosure, staffing intensity, and the total score and principal
component score calculated using the these variables. Based on the principal component
score, Suzuki (2002) concludes that for-profit providers supply better quality services.
However, Shimizutani and Suzuki (2006) do not observe any clear-cut difference be-
tween nonprofit and for-profit providers based on the principal component score. On the
other hand, Kitazaki, Yamauchi and Suzuki (2004) provide a result contrary to that of
Suzuki (2002). Their result demonstrates that in terms of the total score, the quality of
LTC services supplied by nonprofit providers is better than that supplied by for-profit
providers.
Noguchi and Shimizutani (2002) regard the quality of workers as the measure of
the comparison between nonprofits and for-profits. They show that nonprofit providers
employ better quality workers than for-profit ones.
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The reason why these literatures convey different results may depend on the scope of
the surveys that they analyze. The surveys analyzed by Suzuki (2002) and Shimizutani
and Suzuki (2006) target service providers in Kanto district. Noguchi and Shimizu-
tani (2002) and Kitazaki, Yamauchi and Suzuki (2004) analyze service providers on
a national scale. Suzuki’s (2002) result may reflect the characteristics only of Kanto
district.
This study has two contributions. First, the analysis considers the effect of regulations
as well as that of ownership type in the comparison between nonprofit and for-profit
providers. Second, the analysis concentrates on the quality of group home services that
are not analyzed by Japanese economic researchers.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the data used in the analysis,
Section 3 describes the empirical strategies, Section 4 presents the results, and Section
5 provides a discussion.
2 Data
This study analyzes data from the original survey conducted in September and October
2003. The survey was based on information on group homes provided by WAM NET. In
order to ensure strict compliance, the survey targeted group homes that the author had
not previously conducted research on. In this study, questionnaires were distributed to
all group homes in 13 major cities and some in cities surrounding the 23 wards of Tokyo
in the Tokyo Metropolis and those surrounding Osaka City in Osaka Prefecture. The
author had previously conducted research on 3 group homes in some of the 13 major
cities; hence, questionnaires were not distributed to them. In the case of group homes
located in the cities surrounding Osaka City and the 23 wards of Tokyo, this study
preferentially distributed questionnaires to the group homes that were located closer to
Osaka City and the 23 wards of Tokyo, within the budget constraint. The reason why
the survey targets these cities is that for-profit providers supply their services primarily
8
in urban areas. Thus, questionnaires were sent to 502 group homes, of which 108 group
homes responded by mail.
In this survey, the chief administrator or the assistant answered questions that per-
tained to the group home and the users.4) 5) The questionnaire contained a space in
which a respondent could enter information about a maximum of 27 users per group
home.6)
Similar to previous foreign literatures that analyze the US nursing home market, this
study examines a measure based on user data. As the measure for evaluating service
quality, the analysis focuses on the change in the physical and mental conditions of the
users from the onset of living in group homes to the survey period. This research considers
the change in the levels of LTC need. At the time the survey was conducted, there were
6 categories of the levels of LTC need: ”Requiring support” (Yoshien in Japanese) and
”Requiring care levels 1−5” (Yokaigodo 1−5 in Japanese).7) The LTC insurance system
permits elderly persons satisfying both of the following requirements to avail of group
home services: (1) those suffering from dementia and (2) those certified as ”Requiring
care levels 1−5.”
The ownership types of the providers that responded to this survey are medical corpo-
rations, social welfare corporations, special nonprofit organizations, private companies,
and limited private companies.
This study considers medical corporations, social welfare corporations, and special
nonprofit organizations as nonprofit providers. Further, it regards private companies
and limited private companies as for-profit providers. All medical corporations provide
medical services.
The percentage of for-profit group homes in the survey is higher than that in real
terms. The percentage of group homes operated by medical corporations in the survey
is smaller than that in real terms. On August 22, 2003, just before the survey was
conducted, 718 group homes provided services in 13 major cities and in cities surrounding
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the Tokyo Metropolis and Osaka Prefecture. The percentage of for-profit group homes
was 51.5%. Among the percentage of nonprofit group homes (48.5%), the percentage of
group homes operated by social welfare corporations was 22.0%; medical corporations,
19.8%; special nonprofit organizations, 6.1%; and others, 0.6%. In the survey, of 108
group homes, medical corporations account for 12 group homes (11.1%); social welfare
corporations, for 22 (20.4%); special nonprofit organizations, for 6 (5.6%); and private
and limited private companies, for 34 (31.5%).
3 Estimation Model
As discussed in Section 1, this study conducts two types of comparisons. First, it com-
pares the quality of LTC services between nonprofits with facility services and/or med-
ical services and for-profits. Second, it compares the quality of LTC services between
nonprofits without facility services and medical services and for-profits. If both the com-
parisons show that nonprofits supply better quality LTC services than for-profits, the
result depends on the difference in the ownership type. On the other hand, if the result of
only the first comparison shows that nonprofits supply better quality LTC services than
for-profits, the result depends on whether the entry of facility services and/or medical
services is permitted under the regulations.
This study regards the change in users’ health conditions from the onset of living in
group homes to the survey period as a measure for the quality of LTC services. The
analysis considers the difference in the levels of LTC need between two periods (levels
of LTC need at the survey period minus levels of LTC need at onset of living in group
homes).
The estimation should consider the selectivity bias discussed by Barnow, Cain and
Goldberger (1980). When a user with certain characteristics tends to select any group
home, the change in the user’s health condition may depend not on the difference in the
quality of LTC services between nonprofits and for-profits but on certain characteristics.
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If these characteristics affect the change in the user’s health condition, this research
should consider an empirical strategy to estimate the effect of ownership type separately
from the effect of the user’s characteristics.
This study uses the treatment effects model presented by Barnow, Cain and Gold-
berger (1980). The model is expressed as follows.
yi = x′iβ + δhi + εi (1)
h∗i = k
′
iγ + ui, hi = 1 if h
∗
i > 0; otherwise, 0 (2)






































i(i = 1, 2, ..., n) represents the users. yi represents a change in the users’ health condition
(the difference in the levels of LTC need between the two periods). hi is the dummy
variable representing a user’s choice between nonprofits and for-profits. If user i selects
a group home managed by a nonprofit provider, the dummy variable equals 1. If user i
selects a group home managed by a for-profit provider, the dummy equals 0. The analysis
assumes that the error terms εi and ui follow a bivariate normal distribution with mean
0. The variance of εi is σ2. According to Maddala (1983: p.120), the model assumes
that the variance of ui equals 1. The correlation coefficient of εi and ui is ρ. β, δ, and
γ are parameters. The results are obtained based on a maximum likelihood estimation.
This estimation can provide some implications. As discussed in Section 1, the es-
timation can provide information on whether a transfer from facility services and/or
medical services to group homes is observed in the case of nonprofit providers. Further,
the relationship between users’ health conditions at the onset of living in group homes




Table 1 presents the definitions of the variables. Tables 2−4 provide the descriptive
statistics and Tables 5 and 6 present the estimation results.
Table 5 presents the difference between nonprofits with facility services and/or medi-
cal services and for-profits, and Table 6 presents that between nonprofits without facility
services and medical services and for-profits.
Table 5 demonstrates the estimation results of the treatment effects model. The
correlation coefficient ρ is significant in estimations 1 and 2, although the significance is
marginal. The treatment effects model is appropriate in terms of the selectivity bias.
The estimation for ”Change” as a dependent variable includes some independent vari-
ables. ”Capacity” is used to control the scale effect. ”Year of establishment” is included
to control the effect of care experience. In addition, the ”Requiring care levels 2−5”
categories are included as independent variables. The estimation using the ”Requiring
care levels” categorization has two advantages. One is that it controls the effect of the
initial condition. If the initial condition is poor, the scale of deterioration from the initial
condition appears to be small as compared with the case of a good initial condition. The
other is that it reflects the users’ life history, for example the quality of LTC services
provided before they began living in group homes.
The estimation for ”Nonprofit” as a dependent variable includes independent vari-
ables that represent users’ residential environment and address before they began living
in group homes. Such information reveals the mechanism of users’ transfer between
providers and users’ move between regions.
The coefficient of the nonprofit dummy as an independent variable is negative and
statistically significant in estimations 1 and 2, as shown in Table 5. This result shows that
the deterioration of the users’ health conditions in group homes managed by nonprofits
with facility services and/or medical services is lower than that in group homes managed
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by for-profits.
The other independent variables also explain the change in users’ health conditions.
The coefficient of ”Number of months since the onset of living in the group home” is
positive and statistically significant. In estimation 2, the coefficients of Requiring care
levels 2−5 in estimation 1 and that of the interactions among Requiring care levels 2−5
and the number of months since onset of living in group homes are negatively significant.
The result of the interactions indicates that the deterioration of the health condition of
users with poor initial health conditions is lower than that for users with good initial
health conditions.
The estimation including the nonprofit dummy as a dependent variable shows the
characteristics of people who become users for nonprofit or for-profit providers. The
coefficients of ”Welfare facilities for the elderly” and ”Health service facilities for the
elderly” are positive and statistically significant in estimations 1 and 2. Since the survey
does not inquire about name of the owner of the facility services employed by users before
living in group homes, this study cannot identify whether nonprofit providers transfer
users from their own facility services to their own group homes. However, it has been
observed that users of facility services tend to be transferred to group homes managed
by the same nonprofit providers. This finding implies that the tendency depends on the
network between facility services and group homes within the same nonprofit providers
or between different nonprofit providers.
In addition, the coefficients of ”From the same prefecture” and ”From another pre-
fecture” are negative in the estimation. These results suggest that people who move
from other municipalities or other prefectures tend to select group homes managed by
for-profits. Further, the results indicate that people who are unable to find vacant rooms
in group homes located in previously inhabited areas find vacant rooms in other munic-
ipalities and other prefectures where for-profits are in business.
In Table 6, the correlation coefficient ρ is not significant in the treatment effects
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model (estimations 1 and 3) with respect to the comparison between nonprofits without
facility services and medical services and for-profits. This result does not mean that the
analysis needs to consider the selectivity bias. This study follows the estimation results
based on ordinary least squares (OLS) (estimations 2 and 4).
Estimations 2 and 4 in Table 6 show that the nonprofit dummy is positive and
statistically significant. These results indicate that the deterioration of users’ health
conditions in nonprofit group homes is higher than that in for-profit group homes.
A comparison between Tables 5 and 6 reveals that nonprofits with and those without
facility services and medical services differ in terms of the deterioration of users’ health
conditions. In Table 5, nonprofits with facility services and/or medical services are
superior to for-profits in terms of users’ health conditions. According to Tables 5 and 6,
the superiority of nonprofits shown in Table 5 does not depend on ownership type but
on the synergy between facility services and/or medical services and group homes.
5 Discussion
This study arrives at two findings. First, the results in the previous section imply that
nonprofits with facility services and/or medical services have an advantage over for-
profits in the quality of group home services and the transfer of users. This advantage is
based on the diversification between facility services and/or medical services and group
home services. Second, in the comparison between nonprofits without facility services
and medical services and for-profits, opportunistic behavior in exploiting the asymmetric
information between users and providers is not observed in for-profits. For-profits are
superior to nonprofits without facility services and medical services in terms of users’
health conditions. This result suggests that for-profits provide better quality LTC ser-
vices than nonprofits that do not enjoy the benefit of diversification. These findings
imply that market entry regulations in facility services and medical services lead to the
difference in the quality of LTC services in the group home market.
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The following are the requirements of future research. The efforts toward terminal
care in group homes needs to be considered. The Institute for Health Economics and
Policy (2003: pp.84−91) reports that approximately 45% of the surveyed group homes
are willing to provide terminal care in the future. If the number of group homes providing
terminal care increases, analyses that take into account the efforts toward terminal care
will be required.
6 Footnote
1) Williamson (1996: p.378) defines opportunism as guileful self-interest seeking behav-
ior, which includes calculated efforts to mislead, deceive, obfuscate, and confuse. He also
states that opportunism should be distinguished from simple self-interest seeking behav-
ior wherein individuals play a game with fixed rules that are obeyed by each player.
2) The Ministry of Health and Welfare (2000: p.132) explain the contents of LTC services
provided by facility services (”welfare facilities for the elderly requiring care,” ”health
service facilities for the elderly requiring care,” ”sanatorium-type medical care facilities
for the elderly requiring care,” and ”sanatorium-type wards covered by medical insur-
ance”).
3) http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/kouzou2/kettei/060217housin.html, accessed on De-
cember 18, 2006.
4) In some group homes, the administrators and their assistants provided information
on all the users. In other group homes, they provided information on some of users or
did not provide information on any users.
5) The questionnaire contains the following sentence: Please answer the following ques-
tions, provided the users in your group home do not have any objections.
6) A group home consists of units. The Japanese government has determined the num-
ber of units in a group home and the number of elderly people living in a unit. The
number of people in a unit has been set at a maximum of nine. The number of units in
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a group home had been revised; several months before the survey was administered, the
government changed the number of units in a group home from three to two. Since it
was observed that many group homes had 27 users, the survey included a space in the
questionnaire in which a respondent could enter information on a maximum of 27 users
in a group home. See Japan Group Home Association for People with Dementia (2005:
p.114).
7) Mitchell, Piggott and Shimizutani (2004: p.6) explain the ”Requiring care levels”
categories as follows: the first or lowest care level category is the so-called ”Requiring
support” condition; in this case, the consumer lives independently but requires assistance
for Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADL) such as taking medication and phone
calls. Above this category are the distinct ”Requiring care levels 1−5,” all of which stip-
ulate that the consumer cannot live independently but requires care in basic Activities
of Daily Living (ADL). An individual ”Requiring care level 1” is defined as having more
IADLs than those in the Requiring support category; this individual would require care
partly for daily living and partly for IADL. An individual ”Requiring care level 2” is
defined as having additional need for help with ADLs in addition to the problems de-
fined above. An individual ”Requiring care level 3” requires more help with both IADLs
and ADLs than one ”Requiring care level 2” and would require total care. An individual
”Requiring care level 4” is defined as having all the previously described conditions along
with a greater need in the ADL area; such an individual would find it difficult to live
without care. An individual ”Requiring care level 5” is defined as finding it impossible
to live without care, and having greater need with ADLs than one ”Requiring care level
4.” To ensure uniformity of certification, primary judgment is based on estimating a
consumer’s ”minutes of care” required per day as well as other indicators of dementia.
The following are described as the typical requirements for each care level: Requiring
support: 25−32 minutes, Requiring care level 1: 32−50 minutes; Requiring care level 2:
50−70 minutes; Requiring care level 3: 70−90 minutes; Requiring care level 4: 90−110
16
minutes; Requiring care level 5: Over 110 minutes.
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